Their Own Drummer

The Iraqi army has some success stories, but problems still exist - like fighting a full-time insurgency on a part-time schedule.

FALLUJAH,

When they go to investigate, there is nothing in sight. Then, one of them sees a round imprint in the dirt of the mosque courtyard. It looks to him like the impression of a metal base plate to which a mortar tube is attached.

The Iraqi soldiers then search the entire mosque. They find the mortar base plate, two rocket-propelled grenade (RPG) launchers, some AK-47s and ammunition rounds that fill plastic water bottles in order to keep out the dust.

They take the weapons and leave the mosque, only to return an hour later to arrest the imam. They know that if they had done it when they found the weapons, people in the neighborhood might have turned violent.

The operation -- a nearly perfect combination of initiative, investigation and execution -- is an example, coalition commanders say, of just how sophisticated the Iraqi army has become in a year.

 "Iraqi army units are standing up," says U.S. Marine Col. David Berger, commander of the 8th Regimental Combat Team, which is responsible for security in Fallujah. "In our area of operations they are working independently without our direct assistance."

It is a new army, the Iraqi government and U.S. military officials insist; it is not the one that turned Fallujah over to the insurgency in April 2004, leading to a bloody showdown to retake the city seven months later.

But, while some units of the new army are proving themselves both in combat and in maintaining security, others, according to both their officers and advisers, have a much more mixed record.

Marine Gunnery Sgt. Nathanial Hill is a U.S. adviser to the Iraqi army's 3rd Company based in Saqlawiyah, on the outskirts of Fallujah. He says his current charges have proved to be good soldiers, but the first company he worked with was so bad he had them sent back to basic training.

Most of the current Iraqis, he says, were also conscripts in Saddam's army. Their thinking is stuck in the old Soviet military model, Hill says.

"They wouldn't make a single move without the battalion commander's orders," Hill says. "We want them to start thinking at the smaller unit level, to develop NCOs (non-commissioned officers). Those didn't exist in Saddam's army. The sergeants would be responsible for doing the captain's laundry or something."

Hill says when he began working with 3rd Company he already had his doubts from his previous experience. At first, he would avoid going on patrol with them.

"They were patrolling Fallujah," says Hill. "I wasn't sure they had the skills in which I could trust my life."

Eventually he went on patrol and discovered, he says, that 3rd Company could do the job. "I would see them start to bunch up, get too close together on patrol. I'd tell them to disperse, but they wouldn't listen. Then I realized they were forming a security perimeter to protect me!"

Now Hill eats, sleeps and patrols with the Iraqis. They have proved themselves not only to him but also to the U.S. Marine commander of this northwest region. The commander has assigned them to work throughout the entire area of operations, not just the city of Saqlawiyah, as their predecessors did.

"They bring special skills that even my men don't have," says Marine Cpt. Greg Wardman, Golf Company commander. "They can search houses better than anybody. They know all the secret hiding spots. Sometimes my guys will go through a place and come up with nothing. The Iraqis will go in and find a stash of AK-47s."

And some, like Staff Sgt. Khaled Shaker, a Kurd from Kirkuk, have intimate, invaluable knowledge of insurgents' techniques from previous military training. Shaker was trained in Saddam's commando school and says he sees the insurgents using tactics taught at the school.

"One of the things we learned," he says, "was to fire three different weapons at once. That way, even with a small force you could appear to be larger. During an ambush we would place an AK-47 in one spot, an RPG launcher in another spot and RPK machine guns somewhere else. Then we would run between the positions and fire them all at our enemy."

Besides his knowledge, Shaker also has his anger to use against the enemy. Like all Iraqis, he was forced to join Saddam's army, but he says the Kurds were constantly singled out to be beaten or killed, even while they served.

While he was in commando school he says he was beaten every day for five months by Sunni officers trying to make him quit, but he never did. Now he is happy to use his knowledge to fight the insurgency.

Sgt. Mohammed Loy, of Samawah in southern Iraq, says he first joined because jobs were hard to come by in post-war Iraq and he needed the money. Depending on rank, Iraqi army recruits earn the equivalent of $400-$600 a month, compared to $2-$4 a month in Saddam's army.

But Loy says he often thinks about how Saddam persecuted the Shias, killing them the way you would cattle or goats.

"Now I'm proud to do this job," he says. "My family is proud of me. I need to do it to protect them."

From initially having very little leadership experience, Loy now commands his own platoon.

Out of 100 men, only five are Sunni; 10 are Kurds and the rest Shia. But those numbers fluctuate every 21 days. Like all members of the Iraqi army, the soldiers of 3rd Company get seven days leave every three weeks -- a generous time-off component that's part of the recruitment pitch.

"Problem is," says Gunnery Sgt. Hill, "a lot of times these guys don't come back after their seven days, and those that do have usually forgotten everything I've taught them. So we have to start all over again."

It's not, U.S. commanders rue, the best way to fight a determined insurgency. But they concede they might have a much smaller Iraqi army without it.

And there are other problems as well, including promotions and regular paychecks. Capt. Khudar Aboud, commanding officer for 3rd Company, says the Iraqi Ministry of Defense is rife with corruption.

Since the ministry took over paying the Iraqi army from the Americans, pay has been late or sometimes never happens at all.

"They don't care about us," the captain says candidly. "Many of those at the top don't have any military experience and are doing nothing to help us."

Weapons, equipment and even uniforms, he says, are often distributed to those units with political ties to the ministry rather than to those that actually need them. The issue of promotions has also created problems, since no Iraq army soldier can be promoted until he has been in the service for three years.

This, U.S. advisers say, creates a leadership vacuum while also undercutting motivation.

Despite the readiness of some units, all of these factors contribute to potential serious problems, which some U.S. advisors and even Iraqi army officers say could keep the Iraqi forces from standing up completely on their own for as many as five more years. That's five more years in which U.S. and other coalitin troops must continue to play a primary role in trying to maintain security in Iraq.

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